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Abstract 
The framework for private antitrust actions in the England and Wales has undergone a number of 
changes in recent years. The Consumer Rights Act 2015 introduced measures to facilitate access to 
justice for victims of anticompetitive conduct. It created a fast track procedure in the Competition 
Appeal Tribunal and granted the Tribunal the powers to permit opt-out representative actions. More 
changes were brought on with the implementation of the EU Damages Directive in March 2017. In 
this chapter, I will take stock of those recent developments and offer an insight into the functioning 
of private enforcement of competition law in England and Wales. I will document key developments 
and issues regarding access to documents (disclosure), joint and several liability of co-infringers, and 
claim aggregation (opt-out representative actions). The recent legislative measures seem to pull 
private enforcement of competition law in different directions facilitating both small claims and 
large compensation actions. The Consumer Rights Act implemented a number of measures to 
encourage private litigation but the impact of the changes following the Damages Directive are not 
clear yet. 
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1. Introduction 
England and Wales is currently one of the main European jurisdictions for private damages actions 
against international cartels.
1
 Although the number of litigated cases is relatively low, the courts and 
the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) attract large multi-party litigation, especially against 
companies that engaged in anticompetitive agreements.
2
 The framework for private actions has 
undergone a number of significant changes in recent years. The Competition Act 1998 set out the 
modernised competition law framework which was complemented by the Enterprise Act 2002, 
introducing a special procedure for follow-on damages claims in the CAT. The Consumer Rights Act 
2015 added more litigation options by widening the CAT’s jurisdiction.
3
 Finally, the UK Government 
implemented the EU Damages Directive
4
 in March 2017 with the Claims in respect of Loss or Damage 
arising from Competition Infringements (Competition Act 1998 and Other Enactments (Amendment)) 
Regulations 2017 (Implementing Regulation).
5
 The UK’s decision to leave the European Union will 
create uncertainty as to the working of the framework for competition claims.
6
 Currently, the 
national rules for private actions apply to both breaches of EU and breaches of national competition 
law and the Brussels Regulation (recast) governs most jurisdictional issues.
7
 
Many of the issues addressed by recent legislation or raised by decisions in the CAT and High Court 
merit an in-depth analysis but go beyond the scope of this chapter. The chapter will reflect on recent 
jurisprudence and assess the potential impact of key changes in the litigation framework. In the first 
part of the chapter, I will provide an overview of the legal framework for private antitrust actions in 
the UK for those who are unfamiliar with its most recent changes. In the subsequent sections, I will 
discuss particularly fast-developing areas, beginning with access to documents in private litigation. 
Subsequently, I will assess the new framework for joint and several liability that implements the 
requirements of the Damages Directive. As I have argued elsewhere, the rules proposed in the 
                                                          
1
 The others being arguably Germany and the Netherlands. To avoid complications, I will focus on the rules 
that apply to competition litigation in England and Wales, ignoring Scotland and Northern Ireland. Most 
private competition actions are brought either in the High Court or in the Competition Appeal Tribunal in 
London. 
2
 Barry J Rodger (ed), Ten Years of UK Competition Law Reform (Dundee University Press, Dundee 2010); 
Sebastian Peyer, ‘Private Antitrust Litigation in Germany from 2005 to 2007: Empirical Evidence’ [2012] 8 
Journal of Competition Law and Economics 331. 
3
 See section 2 below. 
4
 Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain rules governing actions for 
damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of 
the European Union [2014] OJ L 349/1 (hereinafter “Damages Directive” or “Directive”). 
5
 The Claims in respect of Loss or Damage arising from Competition Infringements (Competition Act 1998 and 
Other Enactments (Amendment)) Regulations 2017, SI 2017/385. 
6
 The UK Government triggered Article 50 of the TEU on 29 March 2017. 
7
 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, [2012] OJ L 
351/1 (Brussels Regulation (recast). 
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Directive are far from clear or positive for claimants.
8
 A distinct feature of UK litigation in 
competition law is the availability of an opt-out group action which I am going to discuss in 
subsection 3.3. I conclude in section 4. 
 
2. Framework for private actions in England and Wales  
In this section, I outline the main characteristics of private antitrust litigation in the UK.
9
  Access to 
files in civil litigation, changes to joint and several liability following the implementation of the 
Damages Directive and the opt-out representative action will be discussed in section 3. 
Victims of anticompetitive conduct have a genuine choice to bring their claims in either the High 
Court (Chancery Division) or the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT).
10
 The former is an ordinary 
court that deals, inter alia, with competition law litigation. The latter is a specialist court for 
competition law that hears complaints against decisions of the Competition and Markets Authority 
(CMA) and the sectoral regulators. It also functions as a special court for private disputes that are 
brought on the basis of Articles 101, 102 TFEU and the national equivalents in the Competition Act 
1998. Before the Consumer Rights Act 2015 came into force, the CAT’s jurisdiction was limited to 
follow-on damages claims,
11
 i.e. claims that rely on the finding of an infringement by a competition 
authority. Most commentators regarded this as a significant drawback because it severely limited 
the scope to bring claims in the CAT to true follow-on cases and hampered the use the CAT’s 
competition expertise in private competition litigation.
12
 Claims that sought to establish a longer 
infringement period than determined by a competition authority would not have been admissible 
under the old rules. The existence of an infringement finding determined the limits of any private 
claim in the CAT and, thus, the CAT’s jurisdiction.
13
 The Consumer Protection Act 2015 widened the 
                                                          
8
 Sebastian Peyer, ‘Compensation and the Damages Directive’ (2016) 12 European Competition Journal 87. 
9
 For an analysis of the early case law, see Barry J Rodger, ‘Competition Law Litigation in the UK Courts, A Study 
of All Cases to 2004: Part 1’ (2006) 27 European Competition Law Review 241; Barry J Rodger, ‘Competition 
Law Litigation in the UK Courts, A Study of All Cases to 2004: Part 2’ (2006) 27 European Competition Law 
Review 279; Barry J Rodger, ‘Competition Law Litigation in the UK Courts, A Study of All Cases to 2004: Part 3’ 
(2006) 27 European Competition Law Review 341; David Bailey, ‘The Early Case Law of the Competition Appeal 
Tribunal’ in Barry J Rodger (ed), Ten Years of UK Competition Law Reform (Dundee University Press, Dundee 
2010). 
10
 CAT: § 47A CA 1998; High Court (Chancery division): § 2.1 Practice Direction – Competition Law – Claims 
relating to the application of Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty and Chapters I and II of Part I of the 
Competition Act 1998. Claims can be transferred from the High Court to the CAT and vice versa, section 
16(4)(5) Enterprise Act 2002. 
11
 See s 47A Competition Act 1998 (old). 
12
 Mark Furse, ‘Follow-On Actions in the UK: Litigating Section 47A of the Competition Act 1998’ [2013] 9 
European Competition Journal 79. 
13
 See, for example, the Court of Appeal’s statement regarding the CAT’s jurisdiction in Enron Coal Services Ltd 
v EWS Railways [2009] EWCA Civ 647para 30. 
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scope of the CAT’s jurisdiction and gave the CAT the powers to hear stand-alone claims, damages 
actions, other monetary claims and injunction requests.
14
 In addition, claimants in the Tribunal can 
aggregate individual claims in either an opt-in or opt-out representative action and the CAT can 
allocate claims to a fast track procedure. 
There are only a few differences between High Court proceedings and proceedings in the CAT. The 
CAT procedure is said to be more informal and flexible. Cases in the CAT are normally heard by a 
tribunal consisting of three people, with the chairman being a lawyer and the other judges being 
drawn from the CAT’s ordinary members, while High Court cases are usually heard by a single judge. 
Unlike the High Court, the CAT offers a fast track procedure and opt-out claim aggregation.
15
 The fast 
track procedure aims at small claims brought by individuals and small and medium-sized companies 
which can be heard in three days or less.
16
 Follow-on cartel claims do not normally qualify for the 
fast track procedure due to their complexity.
17
 Issues such as estimating the passing-on of 
overcharges, umbrella damages and volume effects of cartels require more evidence than can be 
dealt with in a shortened procedure. In the short period since the Consumer Rights Act came into 
force, the CAT has dealt with a number of fast track applications, typically concerning the alleged 
abuse of dominance in stand-alone cases, i.e. cases without the prior involvement of a competition 
authority.
18
 It seems that the fast-track procedure, combined with the possibility to apply for an 
interim injunction, enables parties to seek protection from the alleged abuse of market power. 
Different periods of limitation used to apply in the CAT (2 years) and in the High Court (6 years). The 
Consumer Rights Act 2015 has aligned the CAT's short period of limitation with the standard period 
of limitation for tortious conduct that was and is applicable in the High Court (6 years).
19
 The running 
of the short two-year limitation period in the CAT was dependent on the finality of the public 
decision (on which the claimants had to rely to open the CAT’s jurisdiction prior to the Consumer 
Rights Act 2015) was final.
20
 The uncertainty about the running of limitation periods sparked a 
                                                          
14
 Section 47(A)(1)(3) Competition Act 1998. For an interim injunction application, see UKRS Training Limited v 
NSAR Limited, Case No: 1258/5/7/16. 
15
 See rule 58 Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015 (fast track). Lianne Craig, Tom Bolster and Gurpreet 
Chhokar, ‘Living up to Expectations? The Consumer Rights Act 2015, a Year on’ (2017) Global Competition 
Litigation Review 31. For opt-out group actions, see next section below. 
16
 2015 CAT Rules r. 58. 
17
 Breasley Pillows Ltd v Vita Cellular Foams (UK) Ltd [2016] CAT 8. 
18
 Socrates Training Limited v The Law Society of England and Wales, Case No: 1249/5/7/16 (This is the first 
fast track claim proceeding to trial. Judgement is pending); Shahid Latif & Mohammed Abdul Waheed v Tesco 
Stores Limited, Case No: 1247/5/7/16 (Parties settled); Labinvesta Limited v Dako Denmark, Case No: 
1273/5/7/16; NCRQ Ltd v Institution for Occupational Safety and Health, Case No: Case number: 1243/5/7/15 
19
 Section 2 Limitation Act 1980. 
20
 For an overview of the previously applicable limitation period, see Nicola Boyle, Lesley Hannah and Stella 
Gartagani, ‘United Kingdom: Supreme Court clarifies time limits for damages claimants in the CAT’ (2014) 
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number of litigation battles and prompted the Government to adjust the CAT's limitation period to 
six years.
21
 The period of limitation begins to run from the date on which the cause of action 
accrued.
22
 The start of the period of limitation is postponed if any fact relevant to the claimant’s case 
has been deliberately concealed from him by the claimant.
23
 It is important to note that the claimant 
only needs to know facts that are sufficient to plead a prima facie case.
24
 Appeals against the 
decision of the competition authority do no longer interrupt the running of the limitation period. 
The Implementing Regulation has not affected the limitation period applied in the English courts as it 
exceeds the period of five years that is set out in the Damages Directive. In accordance with the 
Directive, the Implementing Regulation suspends the running of the period of limitation when a 
competition authority investigates an allegation of anticompetitive conduct.
25
 
Findings of facts of the CMA (unless the court directs otherwise) and decisions of the European 
Commission, the CMA and national regulators are binding in proceedings in the CAT and High 
Court.
26
 The recent decisions of the Competition Appeal Tribunal and the High Court in the actions 
that were brought against MasterCard demonstrated that the binding effect is narrowly interpreted 
and does not relieve the parties of proving the infringement for time periods that were not 
addressed in the regulator’s decision.
27
 MasterCard is currently defending itself against a number of 
claims, including an opt-out class action in the CAT,
28
 for its setting of Multilateral Interchange Fees 
(MIF) for both debit and credit cards. The European Commission had established that the MIF set for 
cross-board transactions in the European Economic Area (EEA) until 2007 breached Article 101(1) 
TFEU. The claimants in the English proceedings sought to show that the same held true for MIFs set 
in the UK and Ireland, and for MIFs charged after 2007.
29
 In the High Court proceedings, the court 
refused to read the Commission decision ‘across’ and apply the Commission’s infringement findings 
to a more recent time-period and different geographical market.
30
 Thus, the claimants had to 
demonstrate that MasterCard’s MIF actually breached competition law, rather than just proving 
causation and quantum. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Global Competition Litigation Review R41-R45; Pinar Akman, ‘Period of Limitations in Follow-on Competition 
Cases, When Does a 'Decision' Become Final?’ (2014) 2 Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 389. 
21
 For an overview, see Akman (n 20). 
22
 Section 2 Limitation Act 1980.  
23
 Section 32(1)(b) Limitation Act 1980.  
24
 Arcadia Group Brands and others v Visa Inc and others [2015] EWCA Civ 883. 
25
 Article 10 Damages Directive.  
26
 Sections 58, 58A(2), 47A(6) Competition Act 1998. 
27
 Sainsbury's Supermarkets Ltd v Mastercard Incorporated [2016] CAT 23; Asda Stores Ltd v Mastercard 
Incorporated [2017] EWHC 93. 
28
 See section 3.3. below. 
29
 Commission Decision of 19 December 2007, Case COMP/34.579 — MasterCard, Case COMP/36.518 — 
EuroCommerce, Case COMP/38.580 — Commercial Cards [2009] OJ C 264/8. 
30
 Asda Stores Ltd v Mastercard Incorporated (n 27) para 84. 
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As for the remedies of injured parties, it is generally accepted that claimants can seek injunctive 
relief
31
 and damages
32
 in the courts and, after the Consumer Rights Act 2016 came into force, in the 
CAT as well. Competition damages claims and injunctions are now expressively mentioned in section 
47A Competition Act 1998. Since the House of Lord's decision in Garden Cottage Foods in 1983 it is 
clear that breaches of competition law can be pursued via private damages actions in the UK 
courts.
33
 Ironically, the finding that victims can sue for damages on the basis of, what is now, Article 
102 TFEU, worked against the claimants in Garden Cottage Foods who had sought an injunction 
against a monopolist who refused to deliver bulk butter to the claimants. The injunction was denied 
because it was held that damages for the breach of EU competition law are available in the domestic 
courts and that the availability of damages makes the injunction a less suitable remedy.
34
 
Compensation claims for the infringement of UK or EU competition law are normally based on a 
breach of statutory duty.
35
 Claimant sought to establish other causes of action in competition law 
but their attempts to use on unjust enrichment (restitution)
36
 or economic (intentional) torts have,
37
 
so far, been unsuccessful. The economic torts, namely, intentional interfering with business by 
unlawful means and conspiracy to injure using unlawful means, require the proof of intention to 
injure the claimant. While cartels harm their customers and, ultimately, consumers, the Court of 
Appeal held that the Commission decision in the air freight cartel
38
 cannot establish such intention 
and struck out those causes of action.
39
 The intention to make an (illegal) profit in a cartel is not the 
same as the intention to injure the claimant.
40
 Whether the same reasoning applies to restrictions 
that have the object or effect of foreclosing the market is a question that has yet to be answered. 
Exemplary damages, i.e. damages that intend to punish the defended, were available against 
defendants who had not already been punished with a fine by a competition authority.
41
 The CAT 
awarded exemplary damages in the proceedings against Cardiff Bus
42
 but the Implementing 
                                                          
31
 For successful injunction claims see, for example, Arriva the Shires Ltd v London Luton Airport Operations Ltd 
[2014] EWHC 64 (Ch); Purple Parking Ltd & Anor v Heathrow Airport Ltd [2011] EWHC 987 (Ch). 
32
 Very few damages claims have been successful (ignoring settlements): Sainsbury's Supermarkets Ltd v 
Mastercard Incorporated (n 27); 2 Travel Group PLC  v Cardiff City Transport Services Ltd [2011] CAT 30. 
33
 Garden Cottage Foods Ltd v Milk Marketing Board [1983] A.C. 130. 
34
 One part of the test for the grant of injunction is whether damages are an adequate remedy which the 
House of Lords held to be the case. 
35
 ibid. 
36
 Devenish Nutrition Ltd & Ors v Sanofi-Aventis SA & Ors [2007] EWHC 2394 (Ch). 
37
 WH Newson Holding Ltd & Ors v IMI Plc & Ors [2013] EWCA Civ 1377; Air Canada v Emerald Supplies Limited 
[2015] EWCA Civ 1024. 
38
 Commission Decision of 9 November 2010 (Case C.39258 — Airfreight) [2014] OJ C 371. 
39
 Emerald Supplies (n 37). 
40
 Emerald Supplies (n 37) para 169. See also Newson Holding (n 37) where it was held that the economic torts 
are, at least, in principle plausible causes of action. 
41
 Devenish Nutrition (n 36); Cardiff Bus (n 31). 
42
 Cardiff Bus (n 31). 
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Regulation has now abolished exemplary damages in competition law proceedings.
43
 Exemplary 
damages are not available in group actions.
44
 
The passing-on defence and standing for indirect purchasers – one of the prominent aspects of the 
Damages Directive as well as the discussion in academic fora – has, so far, not been of major 
relevance in English competition proceedings. The CAT’s recent decision in Sainsbury’s v MasterCard 
clarified that the passing-on defence is available in competition proceedings and that indirect 
purchasers have standing to use.
45
 Although the Damages Directive did not apply on those 
proceedings, the CAT was critical of the presumption of pass-on that is part of the Damages Directive 
and has not become part of English law. Paras 8 to 11 of the Implementing Regulation introduce the 
Directive’s rules on standing for indirect purchasers and arrange the burden of proof for claims 
brought by indirect victims and for defendants who argue the passing-on defence. In accordance 
with the Directive, in an indirect victim action the defendant needs to rebut the presumption that 
the harm has been passed on to indirect purchasers or indirect sellers.
46
 If the defendant seeks to 
employ the passing-on defence, i.e. the argument that the harm was passed on by the directly 
harmed claimant to the next level of the supply chain, the burden of proof is on the defendant.
47
 The 
recent decision of the CAT in Sainsbury’s v MasterCard
48
 as well as the hearing of the group action in 
Merricks v MasterCard
49
 have offered a glimpse of the issues to come. In the Sainsbury’s case, the 
CAT held that MasterCard did not prove, on the balance of probabilities, that the harm was passed 
on by the claimant to its customers in the form of an increase in price.
50
 In the pending opt-out 
group action, the claimants acknowledged in the hearing for the collective proceeding order (CPO) 
that establishing the pass-through of overcharges is going to be challenging for a proposed class of 
40 million members. Furthermore, tensions between the decision in Sainsbury’s
51
 (no pass-through) 
and the group action (alleged pass-through) were noted. 
Another notable feature of the framework for private actions is the possibility for undertakings to 
set up an CMA-authorised voluntary consumer redress scheme.
52
 The Scheme has not been used so 
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 Para 36 Implementing Regulation. 
44
 47C(1) Competition Act 1998. 
45
 Sainsbury's Supermarkets Ltd v Mastercard Incorporated (n 27) paras 479, 483 ff. The passing-on defence 
was previously mentioned in Devenish  Nutrition (n 36) para 147; Emerald Supplies Ltd v British Airways plc 
[2009] EWHC 741 (Ch) para 37;  Newson Holding (n 37) para 40. 
46
 For conditions., see para 9(2) Implementing Regulation and Article 14 (2) Damages Directive. 
47
 Articles 12 and 14(2) Damages Directive. 
48
 Sainsbury's Supermarkets Ltd v Mastercard Incorporated (n 27). 
49
 Walter Hugh Merricks CBE v Mastercard Incorporated and Others , Case No 1266/7/7/16. 
50
 Sainsbury's Supermarkets Ltd v Mastercard Incorporated (n 27) para 485. 
51
 Sainsbury's Supermarkets Ltd v Mastercard Incorporated (n 27). 
52
 Section 49C of the Competition Act 1998. 
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far but guidance is available on the CMA’s webpage.
53
 The Scheme can address breaches of EU and 
UK competition law. The idea behind the scheme is that it would help consumers to receive 
compensation quicker and more cost-effective. 
The most recent changes were introduced with the Implementing Regulation. This will affect some 
of the key characteristics of private enforcement in the UK as I will demonstrate in the next section. 
The UK Government chose to implement the Directive as a single regime, i.e. making the rules of the 
Directive applicable to both actions based on EU competition law and actions based on the national 
equivalents. The application of the Implementing Regulation is split into two parts. Part 10 
differentiates between substantive and procedural provisions.
54
 The rules on disclosure and the use 
of materials from competition authorities as evidence in competition proceedings apply to 
proceedings that have begun on or after the day the Implementing Regulation came into force, i.e. 
09 March 2017.
55
 All other rules are considered substantive rules and they only apply to claims 
based on breaches of competition law that occurred on or after the day on which the Implementing 
Regulation came into force. Consequently, the rules on disclosure and use of information from 
competition authorities apply to all new proceedings in the Competition Appeal Tribunal and the 
courts even if the harm occurred before the Implementing Regulation came into force. The 
claimants in currently pending damages actions cannot rely on, for example, the presumption of 
harm or pass-through. 
 
3. Focus areas of private litigation in England and Wales 
In this section I will focus on three areas of private litigation that in the case of disclosure and group 
actions, may provide a model for other jurisdictions or in the case of joint and several liability are 
likely to lead to more litigation. In the first subsection, I deal with the changes affecting the 
disclosure of documents in the English courts. The Implementing Regulation is limiting access to 
certain documents and, thus, creates exceptions from the previously liberal disclosure regime in 
England and Wales. Subsection 3.2 discusses the framework for joint and several liability. An 
increasing number of damages actions are launched in the English courts and many of those actions 
are against companies that have engaged in anticompetitive agreements. This leads to contribution 
claims in turn and the defendants will have to grapple with the complicated exceptions that have 
become national law with the Implementing Regulation. Finally, the Consumer Rights Act 2015 
                                                          
53
 CMA, Guidance on the Approval of Voluntary Redress Schemes for Infringements of Competition Law (CMA40 
2015). 
54
 Paras 42, 43 & 44 Implementing Regulation. 
55
 Paras 43 and 44 Implementing Regulation. See also Para 1(2). 
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introduced the possibility of bringing opt-out collective proceedings in the Competition Appeal 
Tribunal. Two cases are currently pending and I will review the issues that have emerged so far. 
 
3.1. Access to documents 
One attractive feature of litigation in England and Wales is the mandatory disclosure of documents 
in the courts. Problems have arisen with regard to the extent to which a confidential version of the 
Commission’s decision and documents containing elements of the defendant’s leniency statement 
should be disclosed.
56
 Although disclosure is not a new aspect of litigation in the English courts, the 
interplay between public investigations and private actions, especially when litigants seek access to 
leniency material and the confidential version of a regulator’s decision, poses a number of 
challenges for the interpretation and application of the disclosure rules. 
Parties to litigation in England and Wales must disclose and allow the inspection of documents that 
are material to the litigation.
57
 Standard disclosure requires that parties inform the respective other 
side about the documents on which they rely, the documents that adversely affect the disclosing 
party’s case, the documents which adversely affect another party’s case or support another party’s 
case.
58
 Normally the parties exchange a list of relevant documents and serve it on the other party, 
including a disclosure statement setting out the extent of the search that has been undertaken. The 
duty to disclose is limited to documents that are or have been in the party’s control.
59
 This includes 
documents the party had the right to inspect or take copies of. The concept of reasonableness limits 
the search for documents a party has to conduct, for example, to certain time periods, categories of 
documents or documents located in certain places.
60
 What is reasonably depends on the particular 
facts of the case and relevant factors include the number of documents that are involved, the ease 
and expense with which a particular document can be retrieved, and the nature and complexity of 
the proceedings.
61
 
Before the implementation of the Damages Directive, there was no particular privilege applicable to 
files and information gathered by a competition authority. Parties could only invoke a number of 
                                                          
56
 I will not explain the rulings of the CJEU on questions of file access in detail. See, for example, Sebastian 
Peyer, ‘Access to Competition Authorities’ Files in Private Antitrust Litigation’ (2015) 3 Journal of Antitrust 
Enforcement 58. 
57
 Civil Procedure Rule 31. For disclosure of electronic documents, see also Practice Direction 31B – Disclosure 
of Electronic Documents. Disclosure in the Competition Appeal Tribunal is governed by Rules 60 to 65, 89 of 
the Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015, SI 2015/ 1648 (hereinafter CAT Rules 2015). 
58
 CPR rule 31.6. 
59
 CPR rule 31.8. Parties are also required to make a reasonable search for documents, CPR rule 31.7. 
60
 CPR Practice Direction 31A, para.2. 
61
 CPR rule 31.7(2). 
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narrow privileges to prevent the disclosure of documents in civil proceedings. The legal advice 
privilege protects communication between the client and his lawyer and, unlike in proceedings 
before the European Commission,
62
 extends to communication with in-house legal counsel. The 
litigation privilege protects information created in preparation of legal proceedings. The privilege 
against self-incrimination prevents the disclosure of documents that would incriminate the 
disclosing party or expose the disclosing party to a penalty.
63
 Confidentiality as such is not a privilege 
that allows a party to protect a particular document from disclosure.
64
 The fact that confidentiality 
does not prevent the disclosure of a document has raised concerns on part of the competition 
authorities that rely heavily on whistle-blowers to detect cartels and fear for the attractiveness of 
the leniency programme should the whistle-blower be exposed to (too much) civil liability. The vast 
majority of large-scale damages cases brought or pending in the English courts and the CAT are 
damages cases in which at least one of the defendants was also investigated by a competition 
authority for an alleged participation in an anticompetitive agreement. Cartel investigations are 
usually triggered by a leniency application and other cartelists have the right to access the leniency 
statement in the course of the investigation. Knowing that some or all of the defendants have 
obtained access to leniency statements with more detailed information about the functioning of a 
cartel, claimants have an incentive to seek access to leniency statements or the confidential version 
of the Commission's decision to support their case. 
The English courts have practised a balanced approach when dealing with requests for the disclosure 
of leniency-related material which, arguably, has been in favour of claimants.
65
 The recent 
jurisprudence was characterised by a nuanced application of the CJEU’s guidance cases on access to 
leniency documents in cartel litigation. In Pfleiderer and,
66
 later in Donau Chemie,
67
 the CJEU held 
that there is no absolute prohibition that would prevent litigations from accessing leniency 
material.
68
 The CJEU stressed that both public and private enforcement contribute to the effective 
enforcement of EU competition rules. National courts are required to weigh the interests in favour 
and against disclosure of leniency material. The English High Court applied the Pfleiderer decision in 
National Grid Electricity Transmission Plc v ABB Ltd.
69
 In Emerald Supplies the Court of Appeal held 
                                                          
62
 Case C-550/07 P, Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd and Akcros Chemicals Ltd v European Commission, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:512, [2010] OJ I-08301. 
63
 R v S [2008] EWCA Crim 2177. 
64
 Science Research Council v Nasse [1980] AC 1028. 
65
 John Kwan, ‘The Damages Directive: End of England's eminence?’ (2015) 36 European Competition Law 
Review 455. 
66
 C-360/09 Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt [2011], ECLI:EU:C:2011:389, [2011] ECR I-05161. 
67
 C-536/11 Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde v Donau Chemie AG, ECLI:EU:C:2013:366. 
68
 For more details, see Peyer (n 56). 
69
 National Grid Electricity Transmission Plc v ABB Ltd & Ors [2012] EWHC 869 (Ch). 
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that the principles to access confidential information were not applicable and used the Pergan 
principles to limit access to the confidential version of the Commission decision.
70
 
In National Grid Electricity Transmission Plc v ABB Ltd, a case following the Commission’s decision in 
the Gas Insulated Switchgear cartel,
71
 the claimants sought access to the confidential version of the 
Commission’s decision, the defendant’s responses to the Commission’s statement of objections and 
the defendant’s responses to requests for information made by the Commission.
72
 All statements 
contained information from the leniency application. Justice Roth applied the balancing exercise 
outlined by the CJEU in Pfleiderer.
73
 He relied, inter alia, on the CJEU’s statement that it is necessary 
“to weigh the respective interests in favour of disclosure of the information and in favour of the 
protection of that information provided voluntarily by the applicant for leniency.”
74
 Justice Roth 
extended the Pfleiderer test, which was established with regards to disclosure of documents 
submitted under national leniency programmes, and held that it also applies to documents and 
information submitted under the Commissions’ leniency programme. He concluded that access to 
some information should be granted. Justice Roth ordered the release of the redacted version of the 
confidential Commission decision and ABB’s, one of the defendant’s, response to the Commission’s 
request for information. Disclosure was ordered within a confidentiality ring to protect 
confidentiality information.
75
 
The High Court made a number of key findings in National Grid. First, it was held that the public 
enforcement proceedings were no longer ongoing despite pending appeals against the Commission’s 
decision. For this access-friendly interpretation, the High Court relied on earlier Commission 
documents, in particular the Commission’s White Paper on Damages Actions, in which the 
Commission strongly supported follow-on damages actions.
76
 Second, Justice Roth established a 
nuanced framework for access to leniency-related material by posing several questions. He asked 
whether the disclosure would increase the leniency applicant’s exposure to liability compared to 
non-cooperating parties. He determined whether the gravity and duration of the infringement 
outweigh the concerns regarding the deterrence of potential leniency applicants. Finally, the court 
stipulated that disclosure must be proportionate. With regards to the first step – exposure to liability 
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– Justice Roth held that all cartelists were co-defendants. Consequently, there was no risk that the 
leniency applicant would potentially be liable for the entire harm. Assessing the gravity and duration 
of the infringement, it was denoted that the serious nature of the cartel and its duration of almost 
16 years constituted factors in favour of disclosure. For the final proportionality test, Justice Roth 
took into account whether the requested documents were relevant for the claimant’s case and 
whether the requested documents were available from other sources. It was held that the 
information could not be obtained from another source without excessive difficulties for the 
claimant.  
In the other aforementioned case, Emeralds Supplies,
77
 which has its origins in the Commissions’ 
decision against the participants of the air freight cartel,
78
 the Court of Appeal reduced the scope of 
disclosure by applying the Pergan decision rather than the Pfleiderer principles. It held that the 
confidential version of the Commission’s decision must be redacted before being disclosed to the 
claimant to protect innocent non-addressees of the Commission’s decision. The first-instance judge 
in High Court ordered the disclosure of the unredacted confidential version of the Commission's 
decision after becoming frustrated with the Commission's failure to produce a non-confidential 
version in more than four years. The confidential version of the decision contained references to 
non-addressees, implying that those non-addressees were implicated in the air freight cartel. The 
Commission decision also contained references to findings against the addressees that did not form 
part of the operative part of the decision (and could, thus, not be appealed). On appeal from the 
High Court to the Court of Appeal, the defendants argued successfully that the so-called Pergan 
material must be redacted.
79
 In Pergan, the General Court found that the presumption of innocence 
prevents the disclosure of certain types of information about non-addressees.
80
 It means excluding 
statements that either describe conduct which is characterised by the Commission as infringing 
Article 101 TFEU or allude to breaches of competition law which can no longer be challenged or 
appealed in the courts.
81
 Releasing information within a confidentiality ring was not deemed to be 
sufficient to protect the rights of the non-addressees. Consequently, the Court of Appeal did not 
apply the weighing test under Pfleiderer. It held that this test is confined to balance the interests of 
addressee defendants (and the competition authority) and the interests of the claimants in obtaining 
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compensation. Some argue that this decision is not restricting access to documents but is rather 
based on its particular facts.
82
 
Disclosure requests in the English courts have prompted the European Commission to intervene in 
recent years and opinions on the disclosure of documents in damages actions against Mastercard.
83
 
In Morrisson v Mastercard,
84
 the Commission referred to the weighing test outlined in Donau Chemie 
and Pfleiderer,
85
 stressing the importance of public law enforcement.
86
 It did not object to a 
disclosure of the defendant’s response to the statement of objections as this would not undermine 
an undertaking's interest in defending itself when under investigation when the Commission has 
closed its case.
87
 As for other information submitted to the Commission during its investigation, it 
alerted the court to the fact that some of the information stems from third parties and that a 
confidentiality ring may not satisfy the interests of those parties.
88
 The Commission did not object to 
the release of the confidential version of the decision within a confidentiality ring or with redactions 
to protect confidential information.
89
 In its second opinion issued in proceedings against MasterCard 
for its anticompetitive setting of Multilateral Interchange Fees (MIFs), the Commission opposed a 
request that sought disclosure of surveys that were part of the Commission's file in an on-going 
investigation and which Mastercard had obtained by gaining access to the Commission's file.
90
 
Referring to the Damages Directive, which was not applicable in those proceedings, the CJEU's 
Donau Chemie decision and the principle of sincere cooperation,
91
 the Commission objected to the 
disclosure of information from an ongoing investigation as otherwise it would undermine the 
effective enforcement of EU competition rules.
92
  
The weighing approach used in the English courts may still be relevant in cases brought post-
Directive but the disclosure of leniency statements and settlement submissions can no longer be 
sought and ordered. The Implementing Regulation creates new privileges with regard to these 
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documents.
93
 In paras 27 to 34 it translates Articles 6 and 7 of the Damages Directive into national 
law. Consequently, leniency statements and settlement offers (the latter only if not withdrawn) are 
blacklisted and can no longer be disclosed to the parties in a competition law action. This is in line 
with the CMA's statement that it will oppose requests to disclose leniency applications.
94
 For most 
parts, the Implementing Regulation copies the Damages Directive. However, one of the potentially 
problematic differences arises from the implementation of Article 6(4) into national law. Article 6 of 
the Directive suggests a heightened proportionality test for disclosure requests for information from 
competition authorities. Article 6(4) lists a number of criteria the courts ought to take into account, 
inter alia, the scope of the request (a), the purpose of the request (b) and the need to safeguard the 
effectiveness of public enforcement (c). However, para 30 of the Implementing Regulation states: 
 "(1) For the purposes of competition proceedings, a court or the Tribunal must not make a 
disclosure order addressed to a competition authority in respect of documents or information 
included in a competition authority’s file. 
 (2) Sub-paragraph (1) does not apply where the court or the Tribunal making the order is 
satisfied that no-one else is reasonably able to provide the documents or information." 
Unlike the Directive, national law creates a presumption of no access that can only be rebutted if the 
documents cannot be sourced from someone else. This is a stricter test compared to the 
proportionality assessment that is supposed to be carried out under the Directive.
95
 It remains to be 
seen whether the interpretation of the Implementing Regulation in the Competition Appeal Tribunal 
and the courts will be in line with the CJEU’s case law. More generally, the Damages Directive’s 
blanket ban on access to settlement submissions and leniency statements undermines the weighing 
principles stressed by the CJEU Pfleiderer and Donau Chemie.
96
 
By not directly copying Article 5 of the Directive but assuming that disclosure under English law is in 
line with the requirements of the Directive, it is likely that no material change with regard to search 
and disclosure is intended. The Directive’s requirement to permit the disclosure of documents only 
when the claim is ‘supported by available facts and evidence justifying the request to disclose 
evidence’ is stricter than the disclosure requirements under English law.
97
 Before the 
implementation of the Directive, commentators were concerned that a heightened standard for 
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initial disclosure would place claimants in a difficult spot after the English decision in Cooper Tire.
98
 
In Cooper Tire, the claimants sought to establish English jurisdiction by suing the English-domiciled 
daughter of a foreign-domiciled company where only the latter was an addressee of the 
Commission’s synthetic rubber cartel decision.
99
 The Court of Appeal held that they must 
demonstrate that the anchor defendant had actual knowledge of the cartel and implemented it in 
the UK. On the facts, the anchor defendant’s knowledge must be sufficiently arguable. However, it 
was held that the claimants only needed to demonstrate the strength of their case after disclosure. 
Thus, Cooper Tire placed a minimal evidentiary burden on the claimants whereas the Directive would 
potentially require more facts and evidence before disclosure can be sought.
100
 
Overall, the implementation of the Damages Directive has reduced the scope of disclosure for 
claimants (bar changes brought upon with the Great Repeal Bill).
101
 The changes regarding disclosure 
will not only affect litigants in the High Court but also apply to proceedings in the Competition 
Appeal Tribunal. The Competition Appeal Tribunal adopted a Practice Direction to align its 2015 
Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules with the Implementing Regulation on 14 March 2017.
102
 The 
Practice Directive directly refers to the proportionality test set out in Article 6(4) of the Damages 
Directive.
103
 Access to leniency documents has been an issue in some cases and a more restrictive 
approach may not reduce the overall benefit of using wide-ranging disclosure with a relatively low 
threshold in the English courts and the CAT. Consequently, this is unlikely to reduce the incentives to 
bring cases in the English courts. However, the ‘copy out’ approach and the disparity between Article 
6(4) of the Damages Directive and para 30 of the Implementing Regulation may lead to uncertainty 
and, consequently, costly litigation. 
 
3.2. Joint and several liability  
The new rules on joint and several liability will have a significant impact on claimants who settle 
their claims, who seek compensation from immunity recipients and defendants who seek 
contribution from their co-defendants. This is largely unchartered territory as the exemptions in the 
Damages Directive had no predecessors in English law. 
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Defendants that jointly commit a tort like, for example, breaching a competition statute, are jointly 
and severally liable. The Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 states in section 1(1) that “[…] any 
person liable in respect of any damage suffered by another person may recover contribution from 
any other person liable in respect of the same damage (whether jointly with him or otherwise).” 
Section 2(1) specifies that the amount of “[…] contribution recoverable from any person shall be 
such as may be found by the court to be just and equitable having regard to the extent of that 
person’s responsibility for the damage in question.” While section 2(1) provides for discretion to 
adjust contribution between jointly liable tortfeasors, the Implementing Regulation introduces new 
exemptions breaking with the principle that joint infringers are jointly and severally liable.
104
  
The Implementing Regulation introduces the contentious exemption for small- or medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs).
105
 SMEs are liable only for the damage done to their direct and indirect 
purchasers.
106
 This exception applies if the firm has a market share of less than 5 per cent and if the 
application of the rules of joint and several liability “[...] would irretrievably jeopardize its economic 
viability and cause its assets to lose all their value”.
107
 Ringleaders, repeat offenders or firms that 
have coerced others into participating in the illegal conduct cannot benefit from this exception.
108
 
Joint and several liability is further restricted in instances where the defendant has received full 
immunity from fines for cooperating with a competition authority.
109
 The immunity recipient’s 
liability is restricted to the harm caused to its direct and indirect purchasers or providers of input.
110
 
However, if claimants are not able to receive full compensation from the other co-infringers, they 
may fall back on the immunity recipient.
111
 Limiting the immunity recipient’s exposure to civil liability 
is thought to encourage whistle-blowers to come forward with information about cartels. The 
motivation to enact such liability privilege is clear but the unintended consequences are likely to 
have the opposite effect. The leniency applicant is the fall-back option for any unsuccessful claimant 
and, thus, the leniency applicant does not know until the end of all proceedings whether he will face 
further claims. It is also not clear how this exception is going to work with limitation periods. To stop 
the period of limitation for claims against the immunity recipient from running, the claimant has an 
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incentive to keep the immunity recipient involved in the proceedings. Thus, despite having his 
exposure to liability limited, the immunity recipient is forced to remain involved in the proceedings 
(and bear at least part of the costs of it). 
Settling defendants also benefit from a restriction of joint and several liability and limited 
contribution. If the claimant settles with one of the defendants, the claimant’s overall claim is 
reduced by the settling defendant’s share of the loss.
112
 This rules is problematic and it will likely 
lead to more litigation because of the ‘share of loss’ criterion. Assume that the claimant has suffered 
a loss of €1,000 from a cartel that existed between two defendants. The claimant settles with one of 
the two defendants for €250. If the settling defendant caused half of the claimant’s loss, i.e. €500, 
the claim will be reduced by €500 and not the €250 the claimant received. On the other hand, if the 
claimant manages to obtain a settlement payment of €750, his claim will be reduced by €500 rather 
than €750. Independent of the recovered settlement, the residual claim will be without the settling 
defendant’s share of the loss. Thus, it is completely irrelevant whether the claimant received less or 
more than the defendant’s share. The consequences are different though. In one case, the claimant 
is likely to be under-compensated, in the other scenario the claimant receives more than he has 
actually lost. This would violate the Damages Directive’s prohibition of overcompensation.
113
 
The ‘share of harm’ reduction of the claim is fraught with evidentiary problems. It assumes that it is 
simple to assess the real harm as opposed to what the settling defendant actually paid. The recent 
Mastercard cases in the CAT and in the High Court have demonstrated that it is not. Parties will not 
simply agree on a counterfactual on which the loss and share of loss calculation is to be based.
114
 
Having to find out what the settling defendant’s share in the overcharge was (rather than looking at 
the settlement payment the claimant received) will lead to complicated assessments. It is imaginable 
that the remaining defendants argue that the settling defendants share was larger than the claimant 
assumed, whereas the claimant has an incentive to argue that the settlement payment is exactly the 
share of the harm caused by the settling infringer. These arguments make sense as the first reduces 
the claimant’s residual claim and is, thus, beneficial for the remaining defendants. The latter 
argument makes sense for the claimant as he has an incentive to recover a 100% of his loss which he 
would not if the settling infringer’s share was held to be larger than the sum for which he settled. 
But who then has to demonstrate that the residual claim is lower than sum alleged by the claimant 
after settlement? Only expensive litigation will help to answer this and related questions and, may, 
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thus, increase the uncertainty which works as a deterrent for many who suffered a genuine loss 
from competition law infringements. 
While a settlement will normally prevent the claimant from seeking more compensation from the 
settling defendant, para 40(3) Implementing Regulation (in line with the Damages Directive) permits 
recourse to the settling defendant if the remaining defendants are unable to compensate the 
claimant. The parties can, however, expressively exclude that fall-back option and are likely to do so 
in practice.
115
 One reason why litigants settle is to end the dispute and move on with business. 
Allowing one settling party to ask for more compensation after years of unsuccessful litigation 
against non-settling co-infringers appears to undermine the entire purpose of the settlement. Thus, 
excluding the claimant’s fall-back option in a settlement agreement is likely to be the default option 
for settling defendants. The peculiar rules of joint and several liability are complemented by a 
limited scope of contribution. The non-settling defendants cannot ask the settling defendant for 
contribution with regard to the remaining claim.
116
 
Even without the difficulties brought upon by the implementation of the Damages Directive, the 
recent decision of the High Court in IMI Plc v Delta Ltd is evidence of the complications that can arise 
in contribution proceedings.
117
 The first defendant (D1), who was sued for its participation in the 
copper fittings cartel and had settled with the claimant, sued another cartelist (D2) for contribution 
under the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978. D2 can argue that it was not liable to the claimant 
but the law does not permit D2 to argue that D1 was not liable to C. The point is that it should 
prevent D1 from having to demonstrate in proceedings against D2 that it was actually liable. There 
is, however, one exception. D2 can argue that even on the factual basis established between D1 and 
the claimant, that D1 would not have been liable, i.e. it basically means that D1 had some defence 
available that would have allowed it to escape liability (so-called collateral defence). In IMI, D2 
wanted to argue that the claimant’s case against D1 was time-barred because the claimants knew 
about the cartel (which starts the running of the period of limitations). The question was whether 
this was a factual circumstance, i.e. D2 has to accept it or whether this fell within the remit of the 
collateral defence. The High Court held that this was the former, thus, ruling in favour of D1. The 
relevance of the case stems from the fact that the period of limitation is not applied between jointly 
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and severally liable defendants to avoid a situation where D1 is forced to immediately sue potential 
contributors and co-defendants.
118
  
The new rules for jointly and severally liable infringers are likely to increase uncertainty and the cost 
of litigation. First of all, it is not clear why those complicated exemptions were introduced into 
English law, especially against the background of the impending Brexit. This topic was not open to 
discussion in the UK Government’s consultation on the implementation of the Directive.
119
 Thus, the 
exceptions, especially the limitations of joint and several liability for settling parties, have been 
copied without amendments into English law. Second, the rules assume that it is easy to work out 
what the co-infringer’s share of the loss is. This assumption does not hold true and the assessment 
of the ‘share of harm’ will spawn satellite litigation. It is also noticeable that the Implementing 
Regulation is at pains to cover both supplier cartels (as intended by the Damages Directive) as well 
as demand-side cartels.
120
 As I have argued elsewhere, the exemptions from joint and several 
liability in the Damages Directive, which have unfortunately become part of English law, are 
problematic because they clashes with the objective of compensation that has driven the reform of 
private damages actions for competition law breaches.
121
 
 
3.3. Opt-out group actions 
The Consumer Rights Act 2015 introduced an opt-out group action for competition law claims in the 
CAT. The opt-out action complements the already existing opt-in action which proved to be rather 
ineffective. In this subsection, I will briefly discuss the issues that arose before the opt-out action 
was introduced and then look at the new framework in the CAT. 
The Enterprise Act 2002 introduced the first competition-law specific opt-in representative action in 
the CAT.
122
 However, neither this special procedure nor the ordinary tools for claim aggregation 
proved to be fit for cases with a large number of harmed individuals. The existing procedural means 
to aggregate individual claims were either too complicated – requiring the identification of individual 
claimants before joining the claim – or attempts to use them to move towards a class-action system 
                                                          
118
 Section 10(1)(3) Limitation Act 1980 mandates a 2 year period of limitation for contribution claims that is 
starting to run on the day a judgement has been given or an arbitration award has been made.  
119
 Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, ‘Consultation: Implementing the EU Directive on Damages 
 for Breaches of Competition Law (January 2016), para 7.31. 
120
 Para 15 Implementing Regulation. 
121
 Sebastian Peyer, ‘The Antitrust Damages Directive - Too Little, Too Late’ (2015) CPI Antitrust Chronicle 1; 
Peyer (n 8). 
122
 S 47B (old) Competition Act 1998. 
20 
 
were thwarted by the courts.
123
 In Emeralds Supplies v British Airways the claimants sought to bring 
an action on behalf of direct and indirect purchasers as a representative action under the Civil 
Procedure Rules (CPR) rule 19.6.
124
 A representative action under rule 19.6 requires that all 
claimants have to have the same interest. The courts interpret this requirement narrowly and the 
Court of Appeal held that direct and indirect purchasers are unlikely to have the same interest.
125
 
The claimants also struggled to identify all potential members of the represented class at the outset 
and the judge found that to be an obstacle to claim aggregation. 
The other route for claim aggregation was the representative opt-in action for damages in the CAT. 
The opt-in action was introduced with the Enterprise Act 2002,
126
 allowing ‘specified bodies’, i.e. 
organisations that had received the approval from the Secretary of State, to bring claims on behalf of 
consumers.
127
 The consumer organisation Which? brought a claim against JJB Sports, a retailer that 
had participated in a price-fixing agreement for Manchester United and England replica football 
shirts.
128
 Despite a national advertising campaign, the consumer organisation only identified ca. 130 
individuals who were able and willing to join the claim.
129
 The case settled and, although those who 
joined the claim received £20 each if they could present proof of purchase of the shirt or present 
one of the affected replica shirts, it was ultimately regarded as a demonstration of the limitations of 
the opt-in action.
130
 
The limitations described in the previous section, especially the lack of incentives to pursue an opt-in 
action, have led to a widening of the CAT’s powers enabling it to allow opt-out collective 
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proceedings under section 47B(new) Competition Act 1998.
131
 According to section 47B(5) the 
Tribunal can make a collective proceedings order: 
132
 
(a) if it considers that the person who brought the proceedings is a person who, if the order 
were made, the Tribunal could authorise to act as the representative in those proceedings in 
accordance with subsection (8), and 
(b) in respect of claims which are eligible for inclusion in collective proceedings. 
The opt-out procedure is only available to claimants domiciled in the UK. Non-domiciled claimants 
have to opt into the class.
133
 Claims are eligible for inclusion in collective proceedings if they raise 
the “same, similar or related issues of fact or law and are suitable to be brought in collective 
proceedings.”
134
 The 2015 CAT Rules specify that claims to be included in collective proceedings 
must be brought on behalf of an identifiable class of persons.
135
 Further factors that are used to 
determine whether an opt-out action ought to be certified include, inter alia, the cost and benefits 
of a group action, whether the claims are suitable for an aggregate award, the size and the nature of 
the class, whether collective proceedings are an appropriate means for a fair and efficient resolution 
of the dispute and the availability of ADR.
136
 The recent class certification hearings (or Group 
Litigation Order (GLO) hearing) in the two pending opt-out group actions have shown a tendency to 
refer to US class action jurisprudence to clarify and determine class certification in the UK.
137
 
The class of harmed individuals may be represented by either a member of the group or an 
individual that was not affected by the anticompetitive conduct if the Tribunal finds that it is just and 
reasonable for a person to do so.
138
 The 2015 CAT rules specify which criteria must be considered to 
determine whether the representative is adequate for the class, including whether there are 
potential conflicts of interests, whether the representative would fairly represent the class,
139
 and 
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whether the representative is suitable to manage the proceedings.
140
 The class representative is 
responsible for the cost of the representative action and must be able to pay the defendant’s 
recoverable cost.
141
 A further control element to protect the members of the class is added by 
section 49A Competition Act 1998 that requires the CAT to approve any settlement on behalf of the 
class. 
The problematic aspect of the new opt-out group action is the funding arrangement and allocation 
of unclaimed funds. Group actions are risky and, as the US experience demonstrates, an expensive 
endeavour. Contingency fee agreements, i.e. fee agreements that have a success fee calculated as a 
percentage of the damages award, are disallowed.
142
 Conditional fee agreements, i.e. fee 
agreements that determine a fee if the case is won (‘no-win, no-fee agreement’), and after-the-
event- insurance are still permitted.
143
 The restrictions concerning contingency fee agreements were 
introduced to address concerns that those fee agreements could distort the incentives to bring an 
opt-out group action in the CAT.
144
 Third-party funding of claims is possible in England and Wales 
and it remains to be seen whether investors are likely to fund competition litigation which is 
currently a rather high-risk undertaking.
145
 Unclaimed awards can be paid fully or in part to the class 
representative.
146
 It is also possible to transfer non-claimed compensation to a designated charity.
147
 
The arrangement for unclaimed funds and funding have been criticised as not giving sufficient 
incentives to bring opt-out actions in the first place. The fact that the Consumer Rights Act 2015 
does not mention third-party funders and whether they are allowed to recover a profit from the 
compensation award, could undermine the opt-out action.
148
 Section 47C(1) disallows exemplary 
damages in collective proceedings, further dampening the prospect of being rewarded for the 
investment. 
Two opt-out actions are currently pending in the CAT.
149
 In Dorothy Gibson the claimants brought a 
follow-on case against the manufacturers of mobility scooters for their participation in a price-fixing 
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agreement. The second pending action is interesting as it is brought on behalf of 40 million 
consumers who were indirectly affected by the anticompetitive multilateral interchange fee set by 
MasterCard in its debit and credit card payment systems.
150
 MasterCard is also litigating cases 
against claimants who were directly harmed.
151
 In the Sainsbury’s v Mastercard the claimant, one of 
the large retailers in the UK, was awarded £68.5m (plus compound interests) in compensation. The 
CAT rejected the argument that Sainsbury’s had passed on the overcharge to its customers. Some of 
the class members in the currently pending opt-out action have probably purchased products from 
Sainsbury’s. Their claim is based on the assertion that the illegal multilateral interchange fee has 
been passed on to them. It is too early to tell how the CAT is going to address the issue but it 
certainly raises questions as to whether consumers have suffered a loss and whether they can 
recover for it. 
 
4. Conclusions and outlook 
The implementation of the Damages Directive has not lead to a major overhaul of the English 
framework for private actions but it has arguably restricted the prospect of compensation in some 
areas.
152
 Especially the new disclosure regime and the problems arising from joint and several 
liability are likely to negatively affect the incentives to bring a claim. However, many of the 
developments outlined in the previous sections are likely to encourage claimants to seek an 
injunction or ask for damages in either the CAT or the High Court. The first cases brought after the 
Consumer Rights Act 2015 came into force suggest that two trends are likely to emerge. The positive 
reception of the fast-track and injunction procedure in the CAT suggests that we will observe more 
stand-alone cases that address relatively small breaches of competition law. An injunction claim can 
also be used as a climbing stone for a compensation claim should the former be successful. The fast-
track procedure in the CAT has had a promising start and it should enable small and medium-sized 
companies to enforce their rights. On the other end of the spectrum, the number of large-scale 
damages actions against members of international cartels is likely to rise in the immediate future. 
These are either follow-on or hybrid cases. The Mastercard litigation has documented that the 
English courts and the CAT are willing to engage with economic evidence in the court to quantify 
damages or, in the case of Asda, reject a claim. We are also likely to see an increase in the number of 
opt-out class actions and, potentially, an extension of opt-out actions to other civil law claims. 
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These observations have been made without mentioning the Brexit so far. This is the big unknown 
that is likely to significantly alter the rules for competition law enforcement in general, and private 
antitrust enforcement in particular. The UK’s departure from the EU will, in the long run, lead to a 
divergence of the substantive competition rules. Depending on the Great Repeal Bill, decisions of the 
European Commission will no longer binding on UK courts – and they are the basis for most follow-
on and hybrid cases at the moment. On commentator argues that this will not diminish the 
attractiveness of the UK as a forum for competition claims.
153
 Claims that are based on pre-Brexit 
infringements can most likely be brought in the English courts. If the Great Repeal Bill deprived 
victims of the possibility to bring such actions, it will most likely be in breach of Article 1 of Protocol 
1 to the European Convention on Human Rights. However, the situation for claims arising post-Brexit 
is currently unclear. Beale argues that the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 
1995, which is currently suspended and the Rome II Regulation applied,
154
 will allow EU law to be 
applied in the English courts.
155
 In the absence of an equivalent to the Brussels Regulation (recast), 
there remains doubt as to the ability of private parties to establish jurisdiction in the English 
courts.
156
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